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I.

Plaintzffs'Rendition of the Facts to the Court are Misleading anddo not Take into
Account any disputes made byDefendants.

Plaintiffs provide avery lengthy statement of the case that includes a set of what they purport
to the Court to be facts, but are actually simply their versions of the facts without apprising the Court
of the fact that they are disputed. Although such a detailed recitation of facts is wholly unnecessary
for this Court to make decisions regarding possible errors of law made by the court below,
Defendants would simply like to provide a few examples of Plaintiffs' errors in submitting to this
Court what they call the "facts".
Some of the errant citations are errant because they do not address the fact that they were
disputed. As just a couple of examples, Plaintiffs assert that "the Scheis were assured the Kuhn's
home could be sold for $189,900 and they could sell it fast and they had a buyer and a back-up
buyer." Resp't Br. 8. The only citations provided in $uppdg of that, though, come froln the Scheis
themselves. In fact, John Merzlock disputed that assertion in trial. Tr. Vol. I, p. 639,l. 7 - p. 641,
1. 5. Plaintiffs, of course, made no mention of this disupte.
Similarly, Plaintiffs recite as a fact that'John Merzloik lied to the appraiser, Wayne Harris,
about whether or not there had already been an appraisal. Resp't Br. 9. In reality, John Merzloclc
disputed that and testified that he recalled telling Mr. Harris about the previous appraisal. Tr., Vdl.
I, p. 636,l. 7-13,
Some of Plaintiffs' statements as to what the facts o f the case are, though, are almost
shameful. When Plaintiffs set forth the facts regarding the alleged agreement that Defendants would
indemnify Plaintifls if the Mountain Park home was not'sold in a year, they assert that Defendants'
counsel admitted that the agreement was signed and "whited out." Resp't. Br. 12. Plaintiffs were
at the trial of this matter and know well that counsel for Defendants made no such admission.
Plaintiffs have made it clear in their briefing that there was some issue as to whether or not
Defendants had whited-out certain portions of the agreements. This Court, even from the verj
limited context provided by Plaintiffs, can

decipher .that Defendants' counsel was making

a joke about the unfortunate turn of events duiing the trial. ~ i r sof
t all, if it had never come up in
trial, would the attorney for the Defendants really volunteer that information at the conference on
jury instructions?

Secondly, and tellingly, Plaintiffs did not even react to the statement in the transcript. 1'f;in
fact, Plaintiffs' counsel had thought that this was truly an admissiotl,there certainly would have been
some ccjnversation following this "admission." In reality, it was never discussed because everyone
knew it was simply a joke. See Tr., Vol. IV, p. 3690,l. 17 - p. 3691,l. 24. It is truly disturbing that
Plaintiffs' counsel would draft and sign abrief with this assertion when each one knows that this was
no admission at all. Finally, Plaintiffs also improperly cite to depositions in their brief. SeeResp't
Br. 8, 11.
I.

The Court should havefound 2hepu~ifive'daniages
awarded by the jury in this
matter excessive and unconstitutional:

Defendants continue to contend that the excessiveness of the punitive damage award requires
a remand. The fact that the award was well over three arid four times the compensatory damages
coupled with the fact that the compensatory damages themselves were so substantial leads to an
unfair result. Proportionality is not the only factor to considt. However, Plaintiffs have not shown
any degree of calculation, nor any real disregard for the rights of others. G r g Inc. v. Curry ~ e a n
Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 3 15, 322 (2003).
As set out in Defendants' opening brief, this award violates the due process clause. The
United States Supreme Court has recognized that punitivedamages a& aimed at the purposes of
deterrence and retribution, and that the Due Process Clause prohibits the impositionof grossly
excessive or arbitrw punishments on aparty. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,417 (2003). In reviewing punitive d,amageawards, the U.S. Supreme Court
has instructed courts to consider: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendantls misconduct,

(2) the disparity between the actual or potential'harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive
damage award, and (3) the differencebetween the punitive damages awarded by the j u y ahd the civil

penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Id. at 418.
In making a determination with regard to the first consideration, a defendant's
reprehensibility, the Supreme Court stated:
To determine a defendant's reprehensibility- the most important
indicium of a punitive damages award's reasonableness- a court must
consider whether: the harm was physical rather than economic; the
tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of
the health and safety of others; the conduct involved repeated actions
or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional
malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.

-

Id. at 409.

Plaintiffs make much of the fact that Defendants argued that the harm was ecoilomical and
not physical, but ignore the other portions of the reprehensibilityguidepost. Though Plaintiffs assert
that there was repeated misconduct, they offer no evidence of repeated violations because there are
none. Repeated conduct surely contemplates similar conduct'to.other parties. There is no proof of
that. Further, Plaintiffs provide no authority or citation to dispute that the Defendants conduct did
not evince an indifference or a reckless disregard for the health and safety of others. How c ~ u l d
they? This.is a real estate transaction. Unless an agent knowingly sold property with h a d l mold
without disclosure, an agent's conduct will not affect the health and safety of others. Certainly, a
more modest punishment could have satisfied the State's legitimate objectives.
Defendants understand and evencited the U.S. Supremecourt in State Farm with regard to
there being no rigid benchmark as to punitive dainagesMd the proportionality of the award.
However, as above argued and argued in detail in the opening brief, considering the substantial
award of compensatory damages, the punitive damages are excessive when taken in total with the
lack of reprehensibility here. Again the compensato~ydamages resulted in awards of $179,219.64
in favor of Kuhn against these Defendants and $84,483 in favor of Scheis against thesellefendants,
The ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages is 3.1-to-1 as to Kuhn and 4.3-to-1 as to

Scheis. Althoughthese are single digit ratios, they are beyond the outermost limit of due process due
to the substantial nature of the compensatory damages and the lack of reprehensibility.

,

.

'

.

Plaintiffs finally argue that Defendants did not even discuss the third guidepost, which is
awards in similar cases. Defendants had not and still cannot find ariy case similar to the one at hand.
Apparently neither can Plaintiffs as they provided no citations either. However, if the first two
guideposts are not met, surely the a&d must be seen as excessive a@ a reversal or remand back
to district court is warranted. Because the court below ignored the first two guideposts and there is
no evidence available as to the third, the court erred. Indeed, the court's only reasoning below for
denying Defendant's motion for a new trial based on the excessiveness of the awed was that the
disparity between what the court would have ayarded and what was awarded did not "shock the
conscience." R. Vol. IV, p. 866j. The court does not address the guideposts or any otheractual law
on the issue.

ZZL The District Court erred in its rulings regarding all of Defendants'post-verdict

motions.
Plaintiffs' arguments that Defendants should not be granted any of their post-verdictmotions
fall short. The failure of the district court to grant Defendants' motions with regard to newly
discovered evidence, fraud and misconduct of the opposing party, irregularities in the proceedings
by the adverse party, and error of law is sufficient error to warrant a remand of this case.
Additionally, though Defendants will rest on their opening brief with regard to the arguments, there
is supporting grounds for a remand in the amount of damages awarded due to passion or prejudice
and the denied motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

A. The Trial Court erred in denying Appellants' Motion for New Trial.
(1)

Plaintiffs did not procedurally default by not filing the affidavits alongwith the
motion for new trial.

Plaintiffs attempt to argue that Defendants ''procedurally defaulted" by failing to file an
affidavit along with the motion for new trial. Resp't Br., 33. They argue that pursuant to Idaho R.

Civ. P. 59(a)(7) and 59(c), an affidavit must be filed. Plaintiffs, however, did not object to the use
of the affidavits at the hearing and even provided opposing affidavits to attempt to rebut the points
made in the affidavits provided by Defendants as set forth in rule 59(c). See R. Vol. IV, page 854866. Further, nowhere in the court's order is the matter of timeliness taken up.

See R. Vol. IV,

page 866a-866s. They did all this without any objectionto the timeliness of the filing of the
affidavits at all. Indeed, Plaintiffs provided no brief in opposition to the motion for new trial arguing
untimeliness. See generally R. Vol. IV. And now, on appeal., they are attempting to argue that the
motion should not have been considered at all.
Plaintiffs' failure to make the timeliness argument beiow should result in a waiver of that
argument with this Court. This Court has often found that failure to object below will not preserve
the issue on appeal. See inter alia State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641,646 (Ct. App. 2001). While the
cases, which make such law, have to do with an appellant whofailed to object and then wants to
appeal, the logic is the same. One mustpresent the argument below to be able to present it on
appeal. Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to ignore the alleged untimeliness of the affidavits below and
then make the argument here on appeal. Plaintiffs waived their argument as to timeliness by
appearing and arguing the matter without any objection as to timeliness.
Indeed in an Idaho case under the old rule, the Idaho Supreme Court found that not objecting
to untimely affidavits waived the right to object to it on appeal. The court explained that:
Section 7-604 of our code, granted to respondent the right to ten days, after service
of the affidavits in support of the motion for a new trial, to serve and file counter
affidavits. This right he could and did waive by appearing, bycou~sel,at the time
and place of hearing the motion for a new trial and by participating therein without
making of record objection to proceeding, or applying for additional time inwhich
to serve and file counter affidavits.
Carey v. Lafferly, 59 Idaho 578,86 P.2d 168, 170 (19.38).
The procedural facts in that case are quite similar to the one at hand. The Appellant moved for a new
trial and filed affidavits after that motion. The Respondent argued the merits and won. The,
Appellants then appealed and the Respondent attempted to argue the untimeliness of the asdavits

Id. at 169-170. Similarly Plaintiffs here have waived their right to this argument by appearing by
counsel at the time and place of hearing the motion for a new trial and by participating therein
without making record objection to proceeding. The timeliness of the affidavits cannot be an issuk.
Further, as the trial court did not recognize the untikeliness of the affidavits and ruled on the
motion based upon the merits, this Court can surely still consider the merits. Indeed, Idaho courts
have ruled on this issue as well. As Plaintiffs have pointed out, the rule requires the submission of
affidavits. It states that "when a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served
with the motion." Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(c).
Addressing the language of that rule, the Idaho Court of Appeals has ruled'that "upon a
motion for a new trial on those grounds that require a supporting affidavit, the court is not required
to act in the absence of such affidavit. Ernst V. Hemenway and Moser Co., Inc., 120 Idaho 941,944
(Ct. App. 1991) (citing ParkStations, Inc. v. Hamilton, 38 &lo. App. 216 (1976)). The .Court
.
went
on to explaint that "the purpose of an affidavit is to give notice of facts previously unknown to the
trial court which support the motion in question." Id. In Emst, the Idaho Court of Appeals found
that the court had knowledge of the irregularities, which included counsel for the defendants
withholding evidence, which "prevented relevant evidence frqm being presented to the jury." Id.
Jacquie Kuhn's testimony would have been relevant surely had her whereabouts been disclosed as
required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Prodedureand withholding her whereabouts prevented relevant
evidence from being presented to the jury.. Additionally, the credit report, which was also withheld
by Plaintiffs, was relevant and would have certainly helped the jury in its decision.
While the affidavit in this matter was not filed with the motion, the Court had the affidavit
in hand when it made the ruling along with affidavits in opposition as provided by plaintiffs. See

'1n addition lo the waiver provided by Plaintiffs by presenting opposing affidavits and failing to argue
timeliness at the hearing, the court provided an extension for filing of briefs due to the court reporter being sick See
R. Vol. I, page 23. Many of Defendants' bases for moving for a new trial were based on having at least a partial
transcript available.

R. Vol. N, p. 866a-866s. Just as in Ernst, the court clearly ruled upon the merits and had the
information available to it that it needed to have in order to make aruling. Id at 866h. The court did
not say anywhere in the record that it was refusing to make a , d i n g on the issue based upon the
untimeliness of the accompanying affidavits. Idat 866a-866s. This was partly due to the extension
granted by the court in order to obtain a copy of a partial transcript and for the Defendants to put
together their brief. See R. Vol. I , p. 23.
The Idaho Court of Appeals' ruling in Ernst was upheld further in Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho
901 (Ct. App.2005). InHarris, the defendant did not file an affidavit with her motion for a new trial
under Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a)(l). The court ruled that:
Although the district court acknowledged the absence of an affidavit
as one reason for denial of the motion, the district court went on to
consider the motion and denied it based upon the merits. The district
court had first-hand knowledge of the proceedings in question.
Therefore, we will also address Alessi's arguments on appeal.
Harris, 141 Idaho at 905 (Ct. App. 2005).
Here, the district court did not make any acknowledgment at all regarding untimely affidavits.
Indeed, it went straight to the merits. R. Vol. N, p. 86611. Again, the court had knowledge of what
had happened. Plaintiffs, again, were able to and did submit opposing affidavits.
(2)

There were irregularities in the proceedings that should allow for remand for
a new trial.

Because timeliness is not an issue, this court should rule that there were irregularities in the
proceedings. Plaintiffs begin their argument in opposition to Defendant's appeal based on
irregularities by indicating that the irregularities must be in the trial proceedings. Resp't Br., 33.
Plaintiffs cite Slaathaug v. Allstafe Ins. Co. , 132 Idaho 705 (1999) in support of their argument..
However, nothing in the citation limits the irregularities to "trial proc6edings". The rule doesnot
specify that the proceedings actually be at trial. Indeed theword proceedings is defined by Black's
Law Dictionary (not to mention common sense) as "the regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit,

including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment."
Black's Law Dictionary "Proceeding" (81h Ed. 2004). This, of course, would include failing to
disclose vital information in discovery as set out in Defendants' opening brief.
Plaintiffs argue then that the Affidavit of Lowell Hawkes was not fraught with hearsay and
that a citation to the affidavit itself in the record is not sufficient. Resp't Br., 34. Defendants cite
to the affidavit itself and also point out that Kelly Kurnm could have provided an affidavit for Mr.
Hawkes to avoid the hearsay in Mr. Hawkes' affidavit. App't. Opening Br. 21-22. Mr. Hawkes'
affidavit at paragraph four details a conversation he had with Jacquie Kuhn (Jordan). Tr. Vol. IV,
page 855. At paragraph 14, Mr. Hawkes alleges that Kelly..Kummacknowledged all sorts of
damning evidence contrary to his signed affidavit. Tr. Vol. IV, page 858. If Kelly KLU& had
actually made these acknowledgments, Mr. Hawkes could have simply acquired a counter affidavit
from him correcting his original affidavit.
The misconduct of Plaintiffs should be readily obvious to this Court. When Jacquie Kubn
moved, her contact information changed. plaintiffs were aware of the move and her new contact
.

.

information. See R. Vol. 111, page 561; see also R. Vol. IV,page 855. As she was listed as a party
with information. Plaintiffs were obligated by .the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to provide updated
information without demand by the opposing party. Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(e)(l). Despite this
affirmative duty, Defendants felt it necessary to make a demand for supplementation. R. ~ o lIV,
.
page 822-824. However, neither the affirmative duty to supplement, nor an explicit demand for
supplementation, could persuade Plaintiffs to abide by the rules &d they did not d i s c l o s e ~ sKukn's
.
whereabouts.
Plaintiffs have never argued that they were unaware of her whereabouts. Rather,
their
. .
argument appears to he that Defendants should have contacted her while the information provided
was correct. Resp't Br., 35. The trial in this matter took place in January, 2003, and Plaintiffs
concealed here whereabouts from Defendants from November, 2001. Plaintiffs argue that the four
months at the beginning of these proceedings should have been ample time for Defendants to contact

her, but Defendants were certainly not up against any deadlines by November, 2001, with the trial
fifteen months away. See id. Plaintiffs cannot shift the fault to Defendants. It was Plaintiffs' duty
to disclose Ms. Kuhn's whereabouts and they did not.
Plaintiffs then appear to argue that this was harmless. They argue that she testifies in her
affidavit that she would have lied and that Judge McDermott found her to be incredible.

Id.

Respectfully, Judge McDennott made the deterinination as to Ms. Kubn's credibility without ever
having met her or allowing her cross-exm'ination. She may have believed that she would have lied
on the stand, but under the pressure of cross-examination,it is likely that the truth would have'come
out. See R. Vol. 111, p. 561. In any case, Defendants should have been afforded the opportunity to
at least depose her and find out.
When a motion for new trial is based upon misconduct; the moving party has only the burden
to establish that the misconduct occurred, the party opposing the motion is then required to establish
that the conduct could not have affected the outcome of the trial! Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132
Idaho 705, 71 1 (1999)(emphasis added). An appellate court need not attempt to quantify the
probability of a different result on retrial. It is,sufficient that the error was prejudicial tind that it
reasonably couldhave affected the outcome of the trial. pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529,534 (Ct.
App. 1989)(emphasisadded). There is no doubt that there was misconduct i d there wasno doubt
that the misconduct could have affected the outcome of the trial. Ms. Kuhn would have likely
testified consistently with her affidavit.
Her testimony would have made it clear that Darren Kuhn lied about his credit problems and
hid documents regarding his credit history from Defendants despitea Request for ~roductionfor
those documents. See R. Vol. 111, p. 560-565. Darren Kubn testified under oath that he was not
aware that Robert Jones performed an appraisal on the Manning Lane house until it came up during
the trial. Specifically, he said:

Q.

Until learning of i t in this trial, did you know 'that Robert
.
. up. You knew he
Jones had, in fact, done - well, let meback
was going to do two appraisals?

I knew someone was supposed to do two appraisals.
You didn't pick him?
No.
Did you play any part in picking Mr. Jones?
No.
But you were agreeable to rely and trust Mr. Merzlock and Mr. Bohn to make
a judgment call as to who would be a fair and common appraiser for both
properties?
Yes.
Did you at any time prior to hearing it in court, realize that the appraisal that
Mr. Jones, in fact, came in with was $261,000?
No. I was never told ofthat appraisal.
Tr. Vol. IV, p. 3656,1.14 - p. 3658,l. 7.
As set out in Defendants' opening brief, Jacqueline Kuhn and Kelly Kumm testified to the
c o n k q in their affidavit.

SeeR. Vol. 111, p. 560-565 and 574-619. Had Jacquie Kuhn been made

available by Plaintiffs, Defendants would have been able to provide evidence that Darren Kuhn was
not being truthfbl.
Further, Kuhn's position at trial was that he had decent credit prior to the purchase of
Manning Lane but that the foreclosure on Mountain Park destroyed his credit. He testified that his
credit would have gone up from a " B rating to an "A" rating but for the foreclosure. Tr. Vol. 11, p.
1532,l. 13 - p. 1533,l. 1. In discovery, the Defendants requested that K h provide copies of all
credit reports for himself or his business. See R. Vol. 111, p. 650. Kuhn provided a credit report for
July 28, 1997 and a credit report for June 4,2002. Id. at 654; see also R. Exhibits 302 and ZZZZ
attached to original transcript. These were to constitute a "before'and after" snapshot of his creditbefore buying Manning Lane and after the foreclosure. We used these two reports to establish his
damages and the expert used them in making in determination of damages. See Tr. Vol. In, p. 2245,
1.16 - p. 2248,l. 18.

The Defendants, however, after communicating with Jacquie Kuhn following the trial, found
out about a third credit report. Darren used this third report in his divorce case, but never provided
it to Defendants in this case despite a clear and unequivocal discovery request that he do so. This,
third credit report is material because it is dated July 29,1999, which is long after the K & ~ Sbought
Manning Lane but only two months before the Scheis quit making leasepayments on Mountain Park.
That credit report shows that Darren Kuhn had a "C" rating even before the foreclosure onMounfain.
Park. See R. Vol. 111, p. 575, 585.
PlaintiffDanen Kuhn's misconduct extended not only to his not apprising Defendants of Ms.
Kuhn's whereabouts despite an affirmative duty to do so under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
.
P. 26(e)(])(A); R. Vol.
and despite an affirmative demand for supplementation. See Idaho R. .Civ.

by his not providing the credit
111, p. 635; R. Vol. IV, p. 822. His misconduct was also evidenced
.
.
report that surfaced after Ms. Kuhn approached Defendants' counsel. As set out in the opening brief,
the credit report was available to him and a request was made of him to produce all credit reports,
but he did not provide or list this particular credit report. See R. Vol. 111, p. 650. It is also important
to note that in the opposing affidavits, neither Bron Ranunell nor Lowell Hawkes even addresses the
fact that the credit report was not submitted in discovery. See R. Vol. IV, p. 854-865. And the court
still chose to ignore it. See R. Vol. IV, p. 866a-866s.
Again, these irregularitiesand misconducts perpetrated by Plaintiffs in this matter could have
easily altered the course of the trial or the result. Defendants must not prove that they would have
altered the course of the trial or the result, but rather only that they could have altered the result. The
district court either misread or misinterpreted the law when it ruled that "had Jacqueline testified at
trial, based on her Affidavit, her testimony probably would not have altered the result." R. Vol. IV
page 866c. As above discussed, the standard is whether theevidence :'could have" altered the result

Pierson, 115 Idaho at 534 (Ct. App. 1989). Courts have also explained the standard as "whether the
irregularity had any effect on the jury's decision." Schmechel v. Dille', M D. , 148 Idaho 176; 219
P.3d 1192, 1196 (2009). Given all of theabov'e, it is blear that this irregularity could hive altered
11

..

the result and that it would have had an effect on the jury's decision.

(3) There is newly discovered material evidence.
There is little reason to provide further argument with regard to this issue as all of the newly
discovered evidence is already noted above and in the opening brief. The same facts that constitute
misconduct constitute newly discovered material evidence in this case. Every shred of newly
discovered evidence in this matter came about due to irregularities in the proceedings. Jacquie
Kuhn's testimony is clear and set out in her affidavit. See R. Vol. III, page 560-565.
Plaintiffs provide little argument to rebut the mounds of new evidence that came forward due
to them not abiding by the rules of civil procedure and disclosing her new whereabouts nor
disclosing the credit report, which clearly should have been disclosed. This credit report, though,

as shown in Defendants' opening brief, changes the entire testimony of Plaintiffs' economist. Much
of the damages as set out by Plaintiffs' economist were based on the credit reports. See Tr. Vol. 111,
p. 2245,1.16 - p. 2248,l. 18. Plaintiff does not dispute the argument about the credit reports except
to say that the trial court found no misconduct. Plaintiffs simply have no answer.

(4) The errors of law committed by the district court are such that the court should
have granted the motion for new trial
At trial, Defendants attempted to' introduce statements made by Jacqueline Kuhn. See
discussion i n z Part V. Plaintiffs claimed that such statements were hearsay. Defendants ggiued,
as will be discussed below, that they were admissions.by a.party-opponent. Darren Kuhn testified
that he gave Jackie authority to enter into contracts in his name. She was acting as his agent
throughout the events that led to this lawsuit. See discussion skpra Part IV.B.1. Under Rule
801(d)(2), the Court erred in not allowing the Defendants to testify regarding statements made by
Jacquie. Improper admission of evidence is a proper grounld for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(l).

See, Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529 (Ct. App. 1989). Consequently, the improper exclusion of
admissible evidence should also be a proper growdf6r a new trial under Rule 59(a)(l). The trial
court has a duty to grant a new hid where prejudicial errors of law have occurred, even though the

verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Schaejkr v. Ready, 134 Idaho 378,380
(Ct. App. 2000). Defendants are entitled to a new trial because of the errors of law set out above.
Defendants continue to assert that there were errors of law committed by Judge McDermott
at the trial of this matter, but will take those matters up below in the section setting out mistaken
evidentiary rulings. These errors of law were certainly significant enough to warrant a new trial
under the 59(a)(7) motion made by Defendants following the conclusion of the trial, but they will
be discussed in their entirety in section V below.

B.

Defendants' motionfor reliefpursuant to rule 60@)should have been granted by
the court below.

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have not met the burden required for fraud under rule
60(b)(3), but as set out in the rule, relief can be granted for "fraud, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party." Idaho R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3)(emphasis added). Defendants have

set out the various instances of Plaintiffs' misconduct throughout the opening brief and this present
reply brief and there is no need to repeat thein now. However, it is important to note that this
misconduct is similar to what is anticipated in the rule. Indeed, federal courts have determined such
misconduct can arise from failure to properly disclose information in discovery, even if it was
accidental. The first circuit court of appeals has said:
Failure to disclose or produce materials requested in discovery can constitute
"misconduct" within the purview of this subsection. See Rozier v. Ford Motor Co.,
573 F.2d 1332,1339 (5IhCir.1978). Misconduct does not demand proof of nefarious
intent or purpose as aprerequisite to redress. . . . The term can cover even accidental
omissions. . . . We think such a ~0h~tIuCti0n
not overly harsh; it takes scant
imagination to conjure up discovery responses which, though made in good faith, are
so ineptly researched or lackadaisical that they deny the opposing party a fair trial.
Anderson v. Cuyovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910,923 (lS'Cir. 1988).
Other federal courts have also found that failwe to disclose or produce information requested in
discovery can constitute misconduct within the purview of 60(b')(3). See inter alia Summers v.

HowardUniv., 374 F: 3d 1188 (D.C. 2004); Cummingsv. General Motors Coup., 365 F.3d 944,955

(lothCir. 2004); Abrahamsen v. Trans-State Express, Inc., 92F.3d 425,428 (6'h Cir. 1996);Schultz
v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626,630 (4IhCir.1994);Stridironv. Stridiron, 698 F.2d204,207 (3d. Cir. 1983).

Though Defendants can find no such case law in Idaho, federal courts operate under almost
exactly the same rule as was cited in this case in seeking for relief. Whether Plaintiffs misconduct
in not supplying the discovery requested by Defendants and required under the civil rules was
fraudulent and purposeful or negligent and accidental, relief is still available to Defendants under
Idaho R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), and the failure to supplement discovery when required under the rule, and
especially when called upon to do so by supplemental demand as set out in Defendants' opening
brief, must qualify the Defendants for relief under this statute.
In any case, the standards for fraud are met here. In order to show fraud, Defendants.are
required to show (1) "a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the
speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the hearer's
ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9)
resultant injury." Partout v. Ifarper, 145 'Idaho 683,688 (2008) (citing Muroun v. Wyreless Sys;,

Inc., 141 Idaho 605,615 (2005)). Defendants have set out these bases for fraud over and pier in
different sections of both this and the opening brief, but will do so again.
Plaintiffs, by failing to respond to supplementation requests and failing to supplement as
required under the rules regarding Ms. Kuhn's whereabouts, made a representation either that they
did not know where she was or that she was still at the addresslisted in Plaintiffs' original discovery
responses. The Affidavit of Jacquie Kuhn shows that this representation was false. R. Vol. 111, page
561. Plaintiffs have never denied this by affidavit or even in their briefs. Clearly, as evidenced by
the information produced in her affidavit, her whereabbuts were material to the issue at hand. See

id. at 560-565.
Also as evidenced by the affidavit of Jacquie Kuhn and the fact that it was never objected to
by affidavit or by Plaintiffs' briefs, Mr. Kuhn knew of the falsity of the old address. Next, every
discovery response is made with the expectation of reliance. To argue otherwise would be

ridiculous. As to requirement number six, Defendants had nd idea where Ms. Kuhn was and why
she was unavailable, but again one always relies on the discovery responses made by a party to an
action. 'Defendant obviously relied on the information given by Plaintiffs as Ms. Kuhn was not at
the trial of the matter. Defendants assumed she was simply lost. That reliance was justifiable as it
came from a discovery response and it resulted in serious injury to Defendants as they were deprived
of testimony that would have shown dishonesty on the part:of plaintiffs and would'have produced
a credit report that would have thwarted Plaintiffs' economist's testimony. See R., Vol. 111, page
560-565,574-575,585-593.

Plaintiffs made no real arguments as to why the elements of fraud were not met except to put
quotation marks around the word facts to intimate that they were untrue. Resp't Br. 40-41. This
cannot suffice. And certainly if Defendants have provided affidavits setting out facts and Plaintiffs
essentially do nothing to dispute them, that must qualify as proof by clear and convincing evidence.
In any case, even if this Court decides that Plaintiffs cannot meet the burden for fraud, there has
certainly been misconduct as set out above.
The argument for fraud carries over to the credit report as well that, as set out in Defendants'
opening brief,was not provided in discovery. Not providing.that report was a representation that
they did not have it. That representation is false. It is certainly material as their expert relied on
credit reports to determine damages. SeeTr. Vol. 111, p. 2245,1.16 - p.2248,l. 18. Darren knew it
existed as he used it in his divorce proceedings. See R. Vol. ID, p. 574-576. ~ a r r e must
n
have
expected reliance on there not being another credit report as he allowed his expert to compute
damages without acknowledging it. Neither the jury, nor the court, nor the ~ e f e n d k t could
s
have
possibly known about it without disclosure especially considering the fact that Jacquie Kuhn's
whereabouts were also concealed. The jury, the court and the Defendants relied justifiably on Darren
Kuhn's discovery responses and damages have been discussed previously.
It is telling that Plaintiffs do not dispute that the credit repoil was material and that it was not
provided to Defendants. See generally Resp't Br.; See alsoR. Vol. IV, p. 854-865.

he^ also do

not dispute that its revelation would have drastically altered the course of the trial. Damages would
have been very different if Mr. Kubn had disclosed this credit report as requested in Defendants'
written discovery.
Defendants, if they cannot be granted a remand based onrule 59(a)(4) for newly discovered
evidence, can still be granted one based on 60(b)(2j. Although ~efendantscontinue to assert that
Plaintiffs' argument regarding the tardiness of the affidavits waswaived by Plaintiffs not pursuing
the matter below, if the court finds otherwise, Plaintiffs should have been granted relief under rule
60(b)(2). Rule 60(b)(2) reads that relief may be granted for i'newly discovered evidence which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to moire for a new trial under rule'59(b)."
Idaho R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). Obviously the same standards andarguments as apply to a motion under
rule 59(a)(4), also apply to amotionunder rule 60(b)(2). No fwther arguments should be necessary
to supplement those made in support of the 59(a)(4) argument made above and in the opening brief.

N. The Court Made a Number of Erroneous Evidentiay Rulings that Require a
Remand in this Matter.
A.

Statute of Frau&.

Plaintiffs make three arguments as to why the court's ruling on the statute of frauds should
not be overturned. They argue that it should not be overturned because it was a mutually
acknowledged contract. This is not the case. Plaintiffs know this is not the case and can provide no
citations for why it would be. Mr. Kuhn may have testified that such a representation was made as
set out in the citations in Plaintiffs' brief, but Mr. Fisher adamantly denies that any such conversation
took place. Mr. Fisher was asked if he at any time agreed that Coldwell Banker would indemnify
the Kuhns if the Mountain Park property did not sell. He responded "I never did tell anyone that we
wouldindemnify the Kuhns." TI. Vol. IV, p. 3187,l. 9-10. This is clearly not an acknowledgment.
He goes on to say that he never agreed to personally indemnify the Kuhns either and that he never
told Bron Rarnmell he would agree to it. TI. Vol. IV, p. 3186,l. 5 - p. 3188,l. 25. Plaintiffs
argument here fails quickly.
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Plaintiffs next argue that there was partial performance. That argument also fails quickly by
virtue of common sense and case law. First of all, there can be no partial performance on this
alleged agreement. The agreement was for indemnification if Coldwell Banker could not sell the
Mountain Park property within one year. That is the crux of the agreement. How could there be
partial performance in this matter? Plaintiffs provide absolutely no reasoning as to what the partial
performance might have been.
In any case, one of the reasons that this alleged agreement falls under the purview of the
statute of frauds is because it was for a contract that could not be completed within a year. See Idaho
Code 5 9-505(4). Plaintiffs made no argument as to why tliisagreement would not fall under that
classification. See Resp't Br., 37-38. In such cases, the doctrine of partial perform&ce cannot
apply. The Idaho Supreme Court has said "it has long been established in Idaho law that the doctrine
of part performance is not applicable to a contract which comes within the statute of frauds because
it cannot be performed within one year."

Treasure Valley ~ a k t r o e n t e r o l oSpecicilists,
~~
P.A. v.

Woods, 135 Idaho 485,489 (Ct. App. 2001). plaintiffs argument fails immediately here as well.
Plaintiffs' final argument with regard to the statute of frauds consists really of just one
sentence. They argue that "A person who misrepresents [sic] the requirements of the statuteof
,

.

frauds have been met, is liable for the consequences ofthat misrepresentation." Resp't Br., 37: First
of all, the citation provided by Plaintiffs to support this arg&enicame from Texas and this is not
binding on this court. There is no Idaho law to support that contention. Additionally, the case cited
was a reversal of a summary judgment granted.' Placer Energy Corp. v. E & S Oil Co. Inc., 692
S.W.2d 197,200 (1985).
Defendants would contend that this argument fails onits face. If true, all that a plaintiff
would have to do is make baseless allegations of misrepresentation and the statute of frauds defense
would be waived. This cannot be the intention of Idaho's lawmakers. The fact that there is no Idaho
law cited by Plaintiffs in support of this argument is telling as well. Indeed, when the court made the
decision below, it did not provide any law in support of the decision, citing instead fairness. See Tr.

Vol. 11, p. 1636,l. 4-12. But this is not a question of equity. This is a question of applying the law
as it stands in Idaho. The court did not do that.
Even if this court were to adopt the law as cited by Plaintiffs, their argument would still fail.
The next sentence from the case indicates that "if the factfinder believes that appellees
misrepresented the existence of a written assignment in order to obtain a valuable service from
appellant, then appellant is entitled to recover the value of that service." Id. The factfinders in this
matter, the jury, never made such a finding. The court made the decision for them by allowing any
and all evidence regarding this oral agreement to come in and not giving any instruction as to the
statute of frauds. See Tr. Vol. 11, p. 1631,l. 12 - p. 1638,1.3. The court ruled as follows:
Well, the jury has to make, obviously, a decision on this case, and they're the sole
judges of the credibility of the witnesses in order for them to, and this is part of
plaintiffs' evidence. In order for them to have the total picture here of what allegedly
occurred, I don't think it would be fair to keep this from the jury, and they could do
what they want with it.
Tr. Vol. 11, p. 1636,l. 4-12.
The court allowed all of the evidence to come in, but acknowledged that the jurors were the
factfinders as to credibility. Under the Texas law, the court may have been without error up to this
point. However, when the court declined the statute of frauds jury instruction, it took the factfinding
away from the jurors. See Tr. Vol. IV p. 3689,l. 17 - p. 3690,l. 6. The jury was never aware at all
that the statute of frauds existed. If the couk wants to allow the factfinders to make the
determination as to whether there was a misrepresentation in this particular regard or not, it must
have included something in that regard in the special verdict for& or at least allow aninstruction
on the statute of frauds.
Plaintiffs appear to contend that because the jury found Coldwell Banker liable for punitive
damages, that constitutes a finding that Coldwell Banker made the particular representation as
alleged by Darren Kuhn. This argument, if indeed it is the argument Plaintiffs are making, is
nonsensical. Coldwell Banker, according to the special verdict form, was found to have acted with

fraud, wantonness, or gross negligence. R. Vol. 11, p. 312 (emphasis added). The jury did not
respond specifically to this issue even if they found fraud instead of possible wantonness or gross
negligence and certainly did not respond as to whether there was fraud with regard to that one
particular issue as would have been necessary to be able to allow the testimony in violation of the
statute of frauds.
The jury did not have the option to make a decision about whether the statute of frauds
should apply or not. If it had applied, they would have had to be instructed. Again, the court's
reasoning below for not allowing the instruction boils down to fairness. In response to the suggested
instmction, the court ruled as follows:
The testimony was that -there was allegedly an agreement, but it's disputed. But
Mr. Ram~nellreduced it to writing and sent it over to Kelly Fisher a ~ itdnever was
signed. I don't think under all the facts of this case, I don't think giving an
instruction on Statute of Frauds would be appropriate. I think it would just confuse
and mislead the jury, but your objection is noted.
Tr. Vol. IV, p. 3689,l. 22 - p. 3690,l. 6
The statute of frauds is the law. It is not the cow's prerogative to decide whether or not the law will
mislead the jury. Over objection, this court refused any instruction on the statute of frauds when he
allowed ample testimony in contradiction to Idaho Code 5 9-505. See inter alia R. at Exhibits 25
and 32; Tr. Vol. 11, p. 1639,l. 10-15.
To make the court's error more egregious, despite not allowing the jury to be aware of the
law of the statute of frauds, it presented the facts of an oral cqntract as law injury instruction number
15. See R. Vol. 11, p. 331. Defendants objected to this instruc'tion.SeeTr. Vol. IV, p. 3689,l. 8-21,
The court essentially relieved Defendants of a defense that the law provides them without any
justification or reasonable explanation. It then gives the jury an instruction that the oral contract is
sufficient without any input on the statute of frauds. This is reversible error.

B.

The court should have allowed testimony regarding statements and assurances
made by Jacquie Kuhn as her husband's agent.

It remains Defendants' position that statements made by Jacquie Kuhn are non-hearsay
admissions by a party opponent. As already set out in Defendants' opening brief. An out of court
statement is not hearsay if the "statement is offered against a party and is . . . . a statement by a
party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment of the
servant or agent, made during the existence of the relationship." IDAHO R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
Plaintiffs make essentially two arguments as to why they believe these statements should not have
been allowed into evidence. First, they argue that there was no agency relationship pursuant to this
rule. And second, they argue that there was no offer of proof of what would have been said.
Plaintiffs argue that there was no agency in this matter despite statements from Darren Kuhn
that the agency relationship existed. He admitted that he authorized Jacquie to sign exhibits five and
six for him. Tr. Vol. 11, p. 1515, 1.1- p. 1516,l. 4. An agency relationship requires authority from
the principal. See Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B. l?, 148 Idaho 89,218 P.3d 1150 (2009). That
authority can be either actual or apparent. Actual authority is "that authority a principal expressly
grants to an agent or impliedly confers on an agent because if is usual, necessary, and proper to
achieve the object of the express authority granted to the agent." Id. at 1170.

hat gr&ting of

authority must not be in writing. Indeed if it is impliedly conferred on an agent as set out in

V'veeken, it could not possibly be in writing. This was an express grant of authority admitted by
Darren Kuhn to have Jacquie sign a number of documents. There was clearly an agency relationship.
Plaintiffs attempt to call into question whether there was actually an agency relationshipin
this matter by citing Idaho case law for the

that ~ a c ~ u~i ue h would
n
have needed written

permission to sign any documents relating to real property conveyances or encumbrances. See
Resp't Br. 30, 44. Plaintiffs provide the following citation in support of this proposition: "The
leasehold is an estate in real property. Since it belongs to the community of plaintiff and his wife,
he cannot convey or encumber it without her signature and acknowledgment." Coppedge v. Leiser,
71 Idaho 248,251 (1951); See also Resp't Br., 30,44.

Plaintiffs miss the point. First of all, in Coppedge,there is nothing in the case that shows
that the spouse who attempted to bind the other claimed to have their authority to do so or that in
other parts of the transaction, the spouse admits the authority was granted expressly. Coppedge does
not say that one spouse cannot give authority to another spouse to sign on his or her behalf if the
agreement pertains to the conveyance or encumbrance of real estate. Plaintiffs have no support for
the argument they need to make.
Secondly, the purpose is only to show that agency existed. If the agency existed, which it
most certainly did, even according to Darren Kuhn, then Ms. Kuhn was an agent and her statements
to others would be admissions of party opponents pursuant to 801(d)(2)(D). Darren Kuhn and his
wife both stated under oath that she had permission to sign documents related to the transaction.
Plaintiffsfs'second argument is that there was no offerof proof made as to what would have
been said. Plaintiffs' brief actually says "the transcript is devoid as to what she would have testified
to at trial." Resp't Br. 44. Plaintiffs though misunderstand the arguments of Defendants' opening
brief. It was the statements made by Defendants at trial regarding what Ms. Kuhn told them that
were improperly excluded. Ms. Kuhn herself, as set out in detail above and in Plaintiffs' opening
brief, was not available at trial. Defendant Todd Bohn attempted to testify as to statements Jacquie
Kuhn made to him regarding permission given her from her husband to sign on his behalf, but was
cut off.

Q.

And Absolute Property Management was not a company with which [sic] Darren

K h had given any authority?
A.

I was told by his wife that he had - -

Q.

Excuse me - - excuse me - please listen.

MR. HAWKES:

Your Honor - -

THE COURT:

Disregard what he just said about his wife.

-

Tr. Vol. I, p. 257,l. 8 17.
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Though no formal offer of proof was made, the rule cited by Plaintiffs provides for situations like
this. It provides in its entirety:

(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and

...
(2) Offer ofproof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the
evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context
within which questions were asked.
IDAHOR. EVD. 103(a)
The rule provides that if what was going to be offered was apparent from the context within which
questions were asked, the court may find error. It is appareit that Todd Bohn was going to testify
to Jacquie Kuhn's statements that she had the authority of her husband to act on his behalf: In
addition, the court heard more arguments that were off the record in this matter. This fact% made
clear by the court's and Plaintiffs' counsel's responses at'various times.
At one point, counsel for Defendant was about to ask some questions of Dave Fuller
regarding his conversations with Jacquie Kuhn, but stoppedto ask the court permission first due to
.

.

an earlier ruling apparently not in the record. The.court respondedby saying "is this some sort of
motion in limine? The Court has made prior order on the alleged comments by Jackie [sic] Kuhn
that are oral will not be admitted." Tr. Vol. 111, p. 2886,l. 23'- p. 2887,l. 2. He then goes on to say
"I don't think it would be proper to allow people to say what she allegedly told them about these
transaction, but if you want the testimony, get her here." Id. at. p. 2887,l. 4-7. This comment is
,

particularly portentous considering the fact that her whereabouts were not disclosed as they should
have been by Plaintiffs. Defendants could not."get her here."
Even Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged tq some extent that there had heen rulings on whether
testimony could come in as to what Jacquie Kuhn said. AS Todd Bohn began to make such a
statement, Mr. Ilawkes interrupted him. He said "now, waii iminute here - - you heard the rulings."
Tr. Vol. I, p. 254,l. 8-9. Clearly there was even more discussion of what Jacquie was going to say
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than is in the record. But, even if there were no more discussion, it was quite clear from the context
of the questions and answers what the response to the questions would have been- especially as
regards Todd Bohn clearly about to testify as to Jacquie Kuhn giving him authority to sign and
testifying about her authority from Darren Kuhn.
The Court at a different point and at the first instance in the'record when it made aruling on
the matter, found that "the ruling will remain the same." Tr. Vol. I, p. 257,l. 25 - p. 258,l. 1. How
can the ruling remain the same if there were no previous discussions on the matter. The court knew
to what the testimony would have pertained. It ruled with full awareness. The requirement that the
context of the questions make apparent what the answers would be is clearly met here.
If Darren Kuhn's wife had the authority to act as his agent for purposes of this real estate
transaction, which authority Darren Kuhn admitted, Todd Bohn should have been allowed to testify
as to statements made by Jacquie Kuhnpursuant to Idaho R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). She was definitely
his agent, even by his own admission, and it was clear from the context of the questions to what Mr.
Bolm would have testified.

C.

.

.

Les Lake's testimony was not going to be hearsay andshould have been admitted

Hearsay is defined quite simply as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." IDAHO

R. E m . 801(c). The court ruled that Les Lake could not testiiji at all, but it was clear from the offer
of proof and the discussion surrounding the offer, that at least some of what Les Lake would have
testified to would not have been hearsay at all. See Tr. Vol. IV, p. 3093,l. 1 - p. 3099,l. 6.
The rule cited over and over again by Plaintiffs must be looked at closely. In order for 803(8)
to come into play, the statement the court would exclude would have to be an out of court statement
or not a statement made by the declarantwhile testifying at the trial. IDAHOR. EVD. 80I(c). If a
statement is an out of court statement, then the exceptions.comeinto play. If it is not an out of court
statement,there is no objection to be made. For Judge McDermott to he able to send Les Lake home
. be
without allowing him to testify to anything, every statement he would make would have to
,

hearsay or otherwise objectionable.
Plaintiffs make much of the test of 803(8)(D) which states that the hearsay exception will
not apply to "factual findings resulting from special investigation of a particular complaint, case, or
incident, except when offered by an accused in a criminal case." IDAHO
R. EVID,803(8)(D). This,
however, is not in itself a basis by which One might exclude testimony. First the statement sought

to be excluded must be hearsay, then the counsel seeking to get in the evidence would have to cite
this section as an exception to the hearsay rule, then, finally, the counsel seeking to exclude the
evidence would cite to this subsection. Simply because a factual investigation of a complaint was
made, does not mean that all the testimony surrounding the investigation is hearsay.
Routinely, investigating officers will testify in personal injury actions.

See inter alia

Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573,578 (2006); Bailey v. Sarzford, 139 Idaho 744, 749 (2004);
Smith v. Praegitzer, 114 Idaho 147, 151 (1988). Pursuant to rule 803(8)(D), the report might be
excluded because it, in itself, is an out of court statement. But the police officer testifying,as to his
observation is not hearsay and there is no reason to even argue that it is. It is the same here. Les
Lake would have testified to what he did to investigate the matter, whom he talked to, and whether
or not based on his investigation, he found any misconduct. None of that is hearsay. Indeed, Mr.
Lake would have testified as to conversations he had with the Scheis. The Scheis are party
opponents and any statements made against their interest w&ldnot be hearsay pursuant to Idaho R.
Evid. 80 1(d)(2)(A).
The court, though, did not even allow counsel for Defendants to conclude the questioning
of Mr. Lake. Counsel requested the opportunity to make an offer of proof, but before counsei could
get to anything of substance, he was cut off by the court and asked what it is he would like to ask Mr.
Lake. TI. Vol. IV, p. 3097,l. 21-24. Mr. Lyons went on to explain a number of things, 'including
statements by the Scheis, that would be admissible. Id. at p. 3097,l. 25 - p. 3099,l. 6. Yet, he was
never allowed to continue his offer of proof. Just the fact that the court did not allow counsel to find
out what the Scheis actually said to him should be enough to warrant a new trial in this matter

Plaintiffs, in support of their argument that Mr. Lake's testimony was rightly excluded, argue
that the case of Jeremiah v. Yanke Machine Shop, Inc., 131 Idaho 242 (1998), provides the Court
with good reason to uphold Judge McDermott's ruling. Indeed, at first blush it may appear that this
case is damaging to Defendants' arguments regarding Les-Lake. The court below in that case ruled
that the defendant could not introduce into evidence the deterniination of the Idaho Human Rights
Commission ("IHRC") or the testimony of the director of the IHRC to "identify documents and
testify concerning the IHRC's determination" based on Idaho R. Evid. 803(8)@). Jeremiah, 131
Idaho at 245 (1998). This Court upheld that decision.

he distinction here though is clear; The

defendants in Jeremiah wanted the director of the IHRC to testify. The director of the IHRC surely
did not perform the investigation. That means everything she would testify to would have to be
hearsay. Idaho R. Evid. 803(8)(D) wouldexclude the testimony from the exception and thus it
should not have been allowed. In the case at hand, however, Les Lake, who was an investigator for
the Real Estate Commission, actually perfonned the investigation. He actually reviewed the
documents and spoke with the complainants and the agents involved.
In addition, it is important to note that Plaintiffs' counsel made reference to conduct by
Defendants that was illegal and grounds for revocation of their license. Specifically, counsel for the
Scheis, in his opening argument said that "what these Defendants did in this case was illegal, and
did you know that it's also grounds to revoke their licenses, as realtors either brokers or agents.
You'll hear about that. That is the conduct that we believe is grounds for punitive damages." Tr.
Vol. I, p. 134,l. 15-20. Surely if Plaintiffs are allowed to make such brazen statements, Defendants
should be allowed to show that there was indeed an investigation and their conduct was NOT
grounds for revocation of their licenses. Les Lake's entire testimony was excluded when the court
should have allowed the testimony subject to possible individual objections regarding relevanceor
hearsay.

D.

Darlene Manning should not have been aliowed to testiJE that Defendants'conduct
. .
was outrageous.
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Plaintiffs argue that the allowance of the testimony of Darlene Manning was harmless error.
Resp't Br. 18-19. They make this argument based on notes made by Defendants' expert witness that
included some of the same terminology used by Ms. Manning in her testimony. The argument is
misplaced. First of all, the ultimate opinion of Defendants' expert was that there was no outrageous
conduct in this matter at all. Tr. Vol. IV p. 3255,l. 10-12. Though Mr. Galloway did have questions
regarding the transaction and made notes regarding those questions, in the end, it w.a his opinion
that there was no outrageous conduct at all. Plaintiffs fail to mention the ultimate opinion of Mr.
Galloway and would prefer to hold him tohis initial concerns before he was able to review the whole
matter. Mr. Galloway, even after cross-examination, makes it abundantly clear that'the notes from
which Plaintiffs take their argument, are not reflective of his actual opinion. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 3474,

1. 22 - p. 3478,l. 24. Clearly, this was not harmless error. :
It is also not harmless error based on the fact that Mr. Galloway was only called as 6 witness
to rebut the opinions set forth by Ms. Manning regarding the alleged outrageous conduct. Tr. Vol.
IV, p. 3378, 1. 4-8. If Ms. Manning's testimony had been kept to what is required under
Rockefeller, Mr. Galloway would never have been called as a witness and his notes regarding
Defendants' conduct would never have come in.
Defendants also continue to contend that Idaho law dictates that experti are not allowed to
testify regarding whether or not real estate agents have breached their duty. Rockefeller v. Guabow,
136 Idaho 637 (2001). In that case as in this orie, the court heard 8 case revolving around the
fiduciary duty a real estate agent owes to his or her client. Thedistrict court refused to allow
testimony from an expert witness regarding the standard of care of a real estate agent. The Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed. The court ruled quite simply that the standard of care of agents is simple
and does not require the assistance of experts. The court found as follows:
The standard of care of an agent is clearly established by prior case
law of this Court. As an agent, [Defendant] owed the [Plaintiffs] a
duty of loyalty, good faith and fair dealing. Although the facts of this
case are different from previous cases, the jury could readily apply the

facts to the legal standard without the assistance of expert testimony.
Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637,647 (2001) (citations omiited).
Again, as is the case here, though the facts of the case differ,the jury could readily apply the facts
to the legal standard without the assistance of expert testimony.
As explained in the opening brief, whilethe expert, Ms. Manning was not allowed to testify
as to the standard of care, she was allowed to testify as to whether or not the conduct of the
Defendants was outrageous. Tr. Vol. 111, p. 2561,l. 6 - p. 2562,1.5; See also Tr. Vol. 111, p. 2620,
1. 9-24. This allowed the Plaintiffs to get in the back door when they could not get in the front. If
case law tells us that experts cannot testify as to whether there has been a breach of good faith, surely
they cannot be allowed to testify as to whether the conduct was outrageous. Yet, Judge McDermott
allowedPlaintiffs to do exactly that. Ms..Manningtestified indirectly to what the court already ruled
she could not testify to directly. Indeed, if the conduct was so egregious that it left the bounds of
human decency, it must also not be in good faith as required by the law for real estate agents.
Actions outside the bounds of honesty, good faith and fair dealing are like asubset of actions outside
the bounds of human decency. It is akin to disallowing expert testimony in a car accident case on
whether or not the expert believes that the defendant was negligent, but allowing that simi expert
to testify as to whether or not the defendant was grossly negligent.
If the jury inRockefellerwas allowed to decide whether or not the real estate agent breached
his fiduciary duty to his clients, it follows that the jury in the case at hand should also bea11owed to
have so much trust placed in it. In allowing the expert witness to testify as to whether' or not she
believed the Defendants' conduct to be outrageous or not, the district court abused its discretion.
Not only is that a decision that should be made by a jury without the input of an expert, but it in
effect allowed the expert to testify that she thought the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty as
well.

To further complicate the court's error, it then allowed a number of jury instructions
regarding what constitutes outrageous conduct, an extreme deviation fiom reasonable standards of
conduct, gross negligence, and wantonness. R. Vol. 11, p. 369-372. These instructions clearly set
forth the standard to be utilized by the jury to make a determination regarding the potential award
of punitive damages making Ms. Manning's testimony superfluous and inflammatory. Essentially,
the instructions say what the standard is and Ms. Manning says that it is met. Ms. Manning's
testimony improperly took away the providence of the jury in reaching its decision by testifying that
the conduct was outrageous. Considering that Rockefellerstands for the proposition that real estate
agents' duty of care is simple and may not be testified to by experts in conjunction with these
instructions, the jury had virtually no choice how to find.

I.:
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refwed along with the Special Verdict Form
This brief along with the opening brief together have sufficiently presented Defendants'
concerns with regard to the lack of an instruction for the statute of frauds. The court improperly took
the matter out of the jury's hands. The statute of frauds was cibviously applicable and, if the court
was going to ovenule the Defendants' objection as to evidence set forth regarding this alleged
agreement, it certainly should have at least provided the jury 'with an instruction for the statute of
frauds. This was a clear error of law. The Defendants' proposed juty instruction number 19 was not
included in the court's final jury instructions. Counsel objected to the exclusion of the instrgion
and the inclusion of the instruction regarding contracts in general without the caveat of the statute
of frauds. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 3689,l. 8-21.
Especially considering the closing argument of the Scheis attorney, an instruction should
have been provided. As set out in Defendants' opening brief, in closing argument, the attorney for
the Scheis reminded the jury that the Scheis were from a generation "who were raised with the ethic
that aperson's word is their bond, an ethic that you didn't need apromise to be in writing, your word
and a handshake were enough." Tr. Vol. IV, p. 3866,l. 9-12, The attorney for the Scheis exploited

the error of the court when the jury should have been able to consider the law- which is that a
writing is required in a situation like this.
Defendants continue to assert that the SpecialVerdict Form allows for double damages. The
damages for a breach of contract in not buying the house when it could not be sold pursuant to the
alleged oral agreement, are the same as a negligence claim or breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs
argue that the issue was not raised below, but indeed it was. When going over all of Defendants'
objections to jury instructions, the issue was v e v clearly raised. Counsel for Defendants explained
his concerns as follows:

I guess my concern is this, Your Honor, if there is a general damage aware of, say,
for example, $100,000, and it's an apportionment as to negligence, how does the
Court deal with apportioning the final actual verdict amount when there might also
be a breach of contract found by the jury. . . . I'm not s e e how we do it Your Honor,
but they're only entitled to one recovery. . . as long as we have one clear instqxti'on,
you know, they're only entitled to one iecovery oh all of the damages . . . . I guess
we'lljust make sure we made that on the record that wewere concerned with that
before the fact.
Tr. Vol. IV,p. 3695,l. 21 p. 3697,l. 12.

-

Defendants' other counsel then also made his concern known, repeating his concerns as to the
possibility of double damages with the proposed special verdict form. He noted that he "would
prefer to take the breach of contract out." Tr. Vol. IV,p. 3700,l. 3-4.
Plaintiffs' argument that the issue was not raised below fails and it is clear that a plaintiff
cannot be entitled to duplicative damages. See Umphrey v, Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700 (1983). Where
Plaintiffs' damages would be the same whether under the breach of contract theory or the negligence
theory, damages awarded for both must have been duplicative.

V7.

The Award of Attorney's Fees is Improper

Plaintiffs argue again that Defendants did not raise the issue of attorney's fees below. They
cite the Idaho Supreme Court for the prospect that a party's failure to object to the action precludes
aparty for challenging that action on appeal. See Resp't. Br. 45-46; Mackowiakv. Harris, 146 Idaho

864 (2009). Defendants filed an objection to the attorney's fees motion made by Plaintiffs. R. Vol.
111, p. 540-549. Additionally, Defendants' opening brief examines the issue quite closely.

Plaintiffs' argument here fails.
VIA

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing and those arguments and citations made in Defendants' opening brief,
the decisions of the district court should be reversed and this case should be remanded for a new
trial. A close look at all of these matters, especially taken in their entirety is ample proof of an
astoundingly unfair trial. The court made numerous errant rulings. These rulings, as set out above,
have so prejudiced Defendants as to return an almost unconscionable result from the jury. For those
reasons, the Appellants in this matter respectfully request that thiscourt find that the District Court

-

made reversible errors and that the matter should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
DATED this -'day of January, 2010.
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